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Abstract 
 
Around 28% of the total forest area in India has been brought under Joint Forest Management 
(JFM) and rest 72% remains virtually open access to local communities. In such a scenario, 
communities actively participating in JFM are also engaged in degrading de facto open access 
forests to meet their basic livelihood necessities. This reveals that, the poverty induced forest 
degradation still continues in JFM regime. This paper theoretically and empirically explains the 
factors that determine the individual indulgence in forest degradation. Based on a survey of 140 
households in three forest fringe villages of Chandaka Wildlife Division of Orissa Sate in India, the 
study shows that lack of education, landlessness and low environmental awareness significantly 
influence the individual involvement in forest degradation. The implementation of JFM merely 
transfers the dependence of local community from one patch to another. It shows that unless the 
source of livelihood is secured, forest degradation by rural poor households would persist. In 
order to halt this depressing scenario, it calls for raising the individual opportunity cost through 
employment generation, skill formation and land allocation to the landless.  
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1. Introduction 
In most of the developing countries, open-access forest, inter alia common pool resources, serves as 
an important source of livelihood for a large population. WCFSD, (1999) states that around 350 
million of the world's poorest people depend almost entirely for their subsistence and survival 
needs on forests and in India, around 275 million landless people and small farmers benefit from 
gathering resources they find within adjacent forests. Khare et al, (2000) shows that out of about 
300 million people (or 60 million households) estimated to live below the 'poverty line' in rural 
India, around 200 million of these people are partially or wholly dependent on forest resources for 
their livelihoods. Due to heavy population pressure on forests the rate of extraction exceeds the 
rate of regeneration and causes forest degradation. It has thus been argued that poverty is one of 
the important reasons behind forest degradation.  
 
Realizing the heavy dependence of local communities on the easily accessible forests, a number of 
developing countries have formally recognised their user rights by making communities a 
stakeholder in forest management. In India, the co-management system, known as Joint Forest 
Management (JFM), came into vogue in 1990. Since then, all Indian states have been trying to bring 
more and more forest areas under JFM. As on March 2005, 99, 868 JFM committees have been 
formed and 21.44 million hectares of forest area, constituting around 28% of total forest area, have 
been brought under this management system (FSI, 2005). However, due to weak monitoring 
mechanism, the forest areas uncovered by JFM remains as de facto open access to the local 
communities. Against this backdrop, this paper probes into the following questions: (i) do the 
participants of JFM stop degrading open access forest? (ii) will JFM be able to halt poverty-induced 
deforestation? The study develops a theoretical model to explain the individual participation in 
forest degradation under differential opportunity cost condition and supports this with the 
primary data, gathered from the household survey conducted in three forest fringe villages of 
Chandaka Wildlife Division of Orissa State in India. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 critically reviews the literature on poverty 
induced forest degradation. Section 3 discuses a simple model explaining the individual 
indulgence in forest degradation under differential opportunity cost conditions. Section 4 briefly 
states the methodology adopted for the study and section 5 presents the findings of study. Section 
6 concludes with major policy implications. 
 
2. Poverty Induced Forest Degradation: Evidence from Literature 
A large body of economic literature discusses about the bi-directional relationship between 
poverty and degradation of natural resources. One way, poverty is seen as a cause of natural 
resource degradation and other way natural resource degradation is seen as the cause of poverty. 
The most famous Brundlant Commission Report (WCED, 1987, pp. 24) recognizes poverty as an 
important cause of environmental degradation and emphasizes the eradication of poverty to 
conserve environmental resources. Similarly, the World Bank (1992) in its World Development 
Report, explicitly states that poor families who have to meet short term needs degrade the natural 
capital by excessive cutting of trees for firewood, and mining other resources. On the other hand, 
degradation of environmental resources, which provides a source of livelihood to the rural people, 
also causes destitution among rural poor. This leads to cumulative causation with poverty, high 
fertility rates and environmental degradation acting upon each other to create a vicious circle 
(Dasgupta and Maler, 1994).  
 
In rural areas common property resources (CPR) such as forests, common pastureland, pond, 
rivulets and so on provide source(s) of livelihood to the poor households. Directly or indirectly 
almost all the households are dependent upon these for one reason or other. Different studies have 
attempted to comprehend the nature and degree of such dependency and quantify them in 
monetary terms (Jodha, 1986; Reddy, 1999; Reddy and Chakravarty, 1999; Cavendish, 2000; 
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Adhikari, 2005; Pattanayak and Sills, 2001, Chopra and Dasgupta, 2008).  Jodha (1986) based on an 
extensive household study over 80 villages in 21 districts in dry regions of seven Indian states 
explains that (i) rural households heavily depend upon CPR for fuel and fodder. (ii) CPRs provide 
an important source of employment when other employment opportunities are not available. (iii) 
CPR provides around 14 to 23 percent of total household income.  Some times the income share 
from CPR in the aggregate household income also exceeds this share. For instance Cavendish 
(2000) from field survey in Zimbabwe shows that open access environmental goods contribute 
roughly 35% of average total household income. Moreover, the figure for the poorest quintile is 40 
percent.   
 
The purpose of using the common pool resources and the level of utility derived from them varies 
across households and region. Some households use these products as a safety net during crisis 
periods. Poorer households, which do not have any other option to smoother consumption, 
(through the possession of livestock, children in off-farm activities) during crisis period, rely more 
on forests. Products from these resources can have important roles in overcoming different 
unpredictable shortfalls (such as, family illness, political turmoil, macro-economic crises or 
ecological disasters) either as a reservoir of auto-consumption goods or as a resource of ‘quick-
cash’ raised from collecting forest products and taking them to market place. (Angelsen and 
Wunder, 2003). This way it helps poor people ameliorate the incidence of poverty and destitution 
(Reddy and Chakravarty, 1999). Therefore, Angelsen and Wunder contend that we can’t simply 
quantify these benefits by summing up their average contribution to subsistence and monetary 
incomes because the ‘safety nets’ imply more than that. Although it is poorer who depend more on 
forest, this dependence is not strictly restricted to this group. To a greater or less extent, wealthy 
households in rural areas also rely on it (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001). These households use 
common property resources to meet household requirement for fuel wood and fodder or to add up 
to their total household income (not subsistence) by selling other valuable products. Chopra and 
Dasgupta (2008) show that non-poor households collect NTFP as well. This is largely influenced by 
the access to markets and vicinity to forest. Similarly, Reddy (1999, pp.1440) shows that though the 
dependence of the poor on commons is high their actual use is relatively lower compared to the 
better off households. Moreover, in high productive farming areas households depend less on 
CPRs.  In a rural set up environmental resources are also important for other key economic 
activities (Cavendish, 2000). For example, people collect manure, bamboo for making boundaries, 
and many other products from forests for agricultural activities. Other products act as 
complementary goods for a variety of economic activities. 
 
The literature on the nature of dependence on forest and other natural resources shows a high 
degree of variance with the socio-economic status and geographical location of the household. 
Nonetheless, a large body of literature also argue that such dependency does not cause the 
degradation of resource base. Rather it has been reiterated that since the poor households largely 
depend upon the natural resource, they take all efforts to conserve the resource base. Although we 
cannot undermine the role of community in conserving natural resources, it is hard to generalise 
for all resources and regions. For example there is ample literature to show that local communities 
not only depend upon the forest for self-consumption but also for selling in the market (Chopra 
and Dasgupta, 2008).  Such overexploitation of any resource base causes degradation. In many 
cases forest serves as the only source of livelihood. In the forest areas where there is no NTFP, 
people depend upon selling timber, fuel wood or other ill practices such as charcoal preparation to 
meet their livelihood. In such cases the forest dependency would result in forest degradation. If the 
number of people involved in such activities is less it might not be unsustainable. However, when 
a huge population is regularly engaged in such activities and resultantly the rate of harvest 
exceeds the rate of regeneration. Thus causes forest degradation.  
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2.1 Poverty Induced Forest Degradation in JFM Regime 
 
Since last two decades there has been a tremendous rise in the formalisation of community 
participation in forest management. Accordingly, various governments have framed policies to 
form more and more forest protection committees and making community a stakeholder in this 
venture. One of the primary objectives of co-management system is to halt forest degradation by 
the community members through allowing the community to part with some benefits derived 
from the forest and creating other gainful employment opportunities in exchange of their services 
devoted to conserve the forest. For example, Forest Policy 1988 of India in one of its’ objectives 
states that a primary objective of all the agencies responsible for forest management …should be to associate 
the tribal people closely in the protection, regeneration and development of forest as well as to provide gainful 
employment to people in and around forest    
 
Under this backdrop, it is imperative to re-examine the hypothesis of poverty induced forest 
degradation. A plethora of studies have attempted to understand the functioning of JFM by 
assessing the level of common action achieved and linking it up with different factors like 
community heterogeneity, cost and benefit sharing mechanism, environmental awareness etc. For 
instance, in contrast to the Olson’s theory of common action3 empirical studies show that at low 
levels of socio-economic disparity higher degrees of common action could be achieved (Saha, 
2004). Saha, in his study on 57 Forest Protection committees in West Bengal, India, finds that 
community with members belonging to similar ethnicity and having less disparity in income 
achieve higher levels of collective action. On the other hand, Somanathan et al (2002), in a study on 
the Van Panchayats in the Kumaon and Gharhwal regions in the state of Uttaranchal in Northern 
India finds no correlation between caste heterogeneity and indicators of the collective action or 
forest cover. Similarly, in contrast to the analysis of Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action4, 
Agrawal (2000) comes out with empirical evidence from the field that the larger communities are 
more efficient than small communities to protect forest. Other studies have found no such 
significant relationship (Somanathan et al, 2002). Another set of studies on JFM point out to 
various factors that influence the success or failure of JFM. The major factors identified are the size 
of the community, social norms, identification of boundary (Agrawal 2000), legal status of the 
Protection committee, role of the stakeholders in decision-making (Dutta et al, 2005), 
environmental awareness of the community members (Hussain & Bhattacharya, 2004), 
accountability of bureaucracy (Vira, 2005), and agencies behind the inception of JFM (Ghate 2003). 
All these studies have also come up with very contrasting findings. Thus, the findings from 
different case studies seem site-specific and can be hardly generalized.  
 
Nonetheless, a higher level of common action does not necessarily mean that community’s 
involvement in forest degradation has stopped. Often communities actively participating in JFM 
are engaged in degrading de facto open access forests. Hence, at aggregate level there will be 
decline in forest cover.  There is hardly any study, which discusses the poverty induced forest 
degradation in such a context and the present study attempts to fill this gap.  
 
In next section we shall theoretically analyse the individual’s decision to indulge in forest 
degrading activities. Next we’ll move on to empirically examine these hypotheses from our field 
study. 
 
                                                           
3 Olson (1971 2nd Print, pp.34) explains that in smaller groups marked by considerable degrees of inequality…there 
is the greatest likelihood that a collective good will be provided…. 
4 Olson (1965) states that Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there 
is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest. 
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3. Opportunity Cost and Indulgence in Forest Degradation: A Theoretical Construct 
We contemplate a forest area where a part of the forest is managed under JFM and another part 
remains under the official control of government but due to weak legal enforcement it serves as de 
facto open access to all. Under this circumstances, an individual involved in JFM could use the 
resource base from the conserved forest, subject to the rules designed for all stakeholders, as well 
as open access forest. A non-participant in JFM could have access only to the de facto open access 
forest. However, use of open access forest involves a penalty subject to the enforcement 
mechanism. Moreover, we are assuming a scenario where the use of forest is purely for economic 
purposes (and is in excess of domestic consumption) and that causes degradation of forest. Under 
this scenario let the total yield from forest for individual i be written as follows: 
)1...(pfi
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where, ofiy and 
pf
iy are the yields from open access forest and protected forest under JFM where 
individual i is a stakeholder respectively. For a non-participant of JFM pfiy will be zero. 
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pfy is the total yield from the protected forest by group of g individuals. 
Therefore, equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
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pf
iy is not determined by individual effort, but group. The per capita benefit from the protected 
forest would depend upon the group’s success in conserving the forest, the nature of the forest and 
the group size.   
 
To reach at the individuals’ decision on engaging in forest degrading activities in open access 
forest lets write the individual profit function as follows: 
 
( )[ ] )3...().(, ofiiinfipfiiofii ymlIypy βϖ +−=∏  
 
where, p is the price of forest products gathered by individual i , ϖ  is the opportunity cost of 
individual i which is determined by the total income of individual. Further, individual’s income 
sources are classified into forestry and non-forestry. Therefore, the labour devoted towards forest 
degrading activities in open access forest (FDAOF) will depend upon the disposable time left with 
individual. Similarly, individual would also compare the returns to its labour from all these 
activities and spend more time for the highest rewarding job. We can write it as follows: 
)4...(jfmi
nf
i
l
ii tttTl −−−=  
where T is total hours in a day, the superscripts to t indicates the time devoted for leisure, non-
forestry income and JFM. An individual with zero time spent for JFM and non-forestry income will 
have the maximum time for accessing open forest and vice versa. The income from JFM i.e. pfiy will 
have a direct effect on the individual opportunity cost. For individuals not participating in JFM or 
for zero income yielding JFM initiatives pfiy value will be zero. Furthermore, even in presence of 
JFM, if the return from FDAOF will be higher individual would prefer to be away from JFM. β is 
the probability of being caught by forest officials, m is the penalty and is proportionately related to 
of
iy .  
 
To reach at the optimal state we need to get the solution for the first order condition as follows: 
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Equation (6) gives us the standard marginal condition (MC=MR) for determining the optimal level 
of FDAOF by an individual. Let’s call the right side of equation (6) as marginal private cost (MPC), 
which has two components such as marginal cost (MC) and marginal penalty (MP). MC is 
determined by the individual opportunity cost and MP is determined by the degree of legal 
enforcement and quantum of penalty. Thus, if 0(.)=ϖ , the level of forest degradation will entirely 
depend upon the enforcement and penalty structure and if 0)( =miβ , forest degradation will 
entirely depend upon MC. When both (.)ϖ  and )(miβ are equal to zero, the level of deforestation 
will be maximum. Given the nature of forest and a similar price structure for all individuals 
accessing the (open) forest, MPC will have a larger influence to determine individual’s 
participation in FDAOF. Further, given the MP for same level of ofiy , MC ultimately determines 
the individual’s participation in forest degradation. A high MPC will thus minimize the level of 
forest degradation and vice versa. A higher level of income from either source –JFM or non-
forestry sources– keeps the individual opportunity cost high. Notably, if the participants of JFM 
derive a higher income from their protected forests it will raise the MC level and discourage them 
to indulge in degrading open access forest. Similarly, strict legal enforcement and prohibitive 
penalty structure will keep the MP high. It implies that individuals with lower opportunity cost 
would be more involved in FDAOF and vice versa. Therefore, a higher opportunity cost and 
stringent penalty structure would be able to prohibit individuals from degrading forests.    
 
3.1 Determinants of Opportunity Cost 
 
Direct measurement of individual opportunity cost is a challenging task for the inaccurate 
reporting of income from primary and secondary occupations. Therefore, for undertaking our 
empirical exercise we adopt an indirect approach to measure individual opportunity cost. The 
opportunity cost (MC in our model) of an individual is determined by a slew of factors; such as: 
asset possession, educational attainment, availability of off-farm jobs in the locality, social 
networks and access to credit. Land is the most valuable asset among rural households. Possession 
of land provides employment, income and social status to the household. Therefore, their 
opportunity cost remains higher. Similarly, education increases the employability of an individual 
by increasing the skill and mobility. Availability of off-farm jobs in the locality, also keeps the 
opportunity cost of unskilled labourers high. Social networks have enormous positive externalities. 
It increases the mobility of labourers, reduce the transaction cost of employment in the 
unorganised sector and raises income. Access to credit also increases the opportunity cost of 
individual by making them self-employed5. The credit market is thin in rural areas. Landlessness 
and thin credit markets limits the scope of being self-employment. The dearth of information 
owing to weak social networks and lack of education restricts the labour mobility. In absence of 
mobility and other gainful employment opportunities in the external world the individual is 
completely dependent upon the work available in the locality; such as wage labour, share cropping 
etc. In rural areas, more specifically in forest fringe villages, common pool natural resources 
provide a resource base to the poor household (Jodha 1986; Dasgupta 1993).  In the presence of 
                                                           
5 Of course it is true that merely availability of credit will not help people to be self employed unless some 
provision is made by the government for allocating the fund to the asset-less households 
 
 
 7
abundant supply of labour and limited employment, the wage rate remains lower. Therefore, the 
opportunity cost of individual remains low. Further, due to weak enforcement and low penalty, 
the expected penalty for individuals remains low. Given the easy access to common pool natural 
resources by the households in forest fringe areas and low MPC (or zero opportunity cost) a 
meagre sum of revenue generated from FDAOF will be profitable for poor households. Thus we 
can link up the poor man’s indulgence in forest degrading activities to their low opportunity cost  
 
4. Methodology 
 
The study completely relies upon the primary data collected from household survey. At the outset 
a pilot survey was conducted in 19 forest fringe villages of Chandaka wildlife division6 of Orissa 
State in India during September 2005. Primary information on the socio-economic status of village 
households, their occupation and participation in forest protection were gathered through focus 
group discussions (FGD) with villagers. Out of 19 villages three were selected with distinct 
characteristics for conducting household survey. Village-A has been protecting forest very well 
since last 40 years and hardly any household is involved in FDAOF. Village-B has also been 
protecting a patch of forest from last 30 years. The Village-C is not involved in forest protection, 
rather most of the households are engaged in FDAOF on a regular basis. Table-1 gives an idea of 
the total number of households and the number of households studied. Village-B was small 
enough to conduct a census study; only two households were omitted due to their absence during 
our survey. In other two villages households were selected following systematic random sampling 
method. In each household one person above 14 years old was administered a systematically 
designed questionnaire. For collecting qualitative information special focus group discussions 
(FGD) were also held in each village. Several rounds of discussions were also held with the forest 
officials at various levels to gather information on the operation of JFM and overall status of forest 
in the specific forest division.  
 
Table- 1: Sample Selection 
Name of the 
Village 
Total no. of 
households 
Number of 
households selected 
% of HHs 
selected 
Village-A 60 34 56.66 
Village-B 35 33 99.05 
Village-C 250 73 29.2 
Total 345 140 40.57 
 
5 Findings of the Study 
 
5.1 Community role in JFM & degradation of open access forest 
 
In this section we undertake a village-specific analysis to assess the performance of JFM and its 
effect on the overall status of forest. As mentioned in the previous section, village-A and village-B 
have been protecting a patch of forest each since last 30 and 40 years respectively and quite 
recently (in 2004) they have been brought under JFM. However this has not brought in similar 
outcomes. Both villages are successfully conserving the patches of forest assigned under JFM 
scheme. However, difference between two villages lies in their economic status and involvement 
in degrading open access forest. Most of the households in village-A belong to, socially stratified, 
general and other backward (OBC) categories. Similarly, most of the households possess 
agricultural land and send their children for secondary and tertiary level of education. Not a single 
household from village-A is involved in degrading open access forest. The main source of 
household income in this village is at least non-forestry.  Although most of the households use fuel 
                                                           
6 See Figure-4.1 and 4.2 in Appendix for the location of study area.  
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wood for cooking, this is met from their protected forest. Similarly, occasional household needs of 
villagers for timber are met from the protected forest.  
 
On the other hand, although households of village-B protect the forest assigned under JFM they 
completely rely upon open access forest for their livelihood. The dependency, however, is not 
limited to the sustainably extractible usufructs, but degrading the forest. All households of this 
village belong to the tribal community and most of them are either landless or marginal 
landholders. Not a single household possesses the legal entitlement over the house plot. Children 
of the village rarely go for secondary level of education.  For a large proportion of households in 
this village, the main source of income is sale of firewood or charcoal in the nearest market.  
 
The protected forests in both villages do not yield any marketable non-timber products such as 
kendu, amla and a variety of leaves used for making plates, broom-making grass etc. Therefore, 
villagers do not get any immediate economic return and have to wait for a couple of years for 
getting any economic return from timber harvest. Thus JFM does not address the livelihood 
problem of villagers in the short run. Due to lack of other gainful opportunities in the locality 
households of village-B largely depend upon open access forest for deriving their livelihood.   
 
The third village of our study (village-C) carries the similar socio-economic characteristics of 
village-B. Most of the households in Village-C are engaged in degrading open access forest. Along 
with meeting their domestic requirement for firewood, and fodder (which might not have caused 
the degradation of forest) they derive their livelihood from the open access forest by selling 
firewood, charcoal and sometimes also timber in the market.  
 
It demonstrates that even in presence of JFM, poverty forces the poor households engage in forest 
degradation. Where rural folk are completely dependent on forest for their basic livelihood 
requirements and the forest does not bear any immediate benefits in the form of valuable 
usufructs, community members go for forest degrading activities –such as excessive tree felling 
and preparing charcoal by setting fire in the forest. The implementation of JFM might enable the 
community to protect a certain patch of forest, but until their opportunity cost remains close zero 
they will be involved in low yielding forest degrading activities from the open access forests. 
Without addressing the livelihood problem of rural households the implementation of JFM merely 
transfers the dependency from one patch to another.  
 
5.2 Determinants of Individual Indulgence in Forest Degradation 
 
Having discussed the functioning of JFM in two different scenarios here we explore the factors that 
influence the individual participation in forest degrading activities. Based on a general analysis of 
individuals and households of three villages we explain these factors.  
 
Inquiries revealed that most of the households in village-B and village-C are involved in forest 
degrading activities. Since the forest adjacent to their village does not bear any major saleable non-
timber forest products, people rely on the sale of firewood and charcoal in the local market to earn 
their livelihood. The local market for firewood and charcoal is of oligopsonistic in nature and 
fetches a very low return7. Also the enforcement by the forest department is very weak. As a result, 
the expected penalty is very low in all these three villages. Individuals could further lower the 
expected cost of penalty as they have reliable information on the movement of forest department 
officials. Therefore, the expected cost of penalty would vary due to the variability of probability of 
being caught by the FD officials and the level of penalty imposed by the forest officials. Although 
the expected cost of penalty varies from person to person, depending upon their access to 
                                                           
7 The respondents reveal that the sale of firewood in the locality fetches a minimum of Rs. 20 and a 
maximum of Rs. 40 depending upon their ability to carry firewood from the forest. 
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information, it is not of high magnitude. Moreover, all the sellers of forest products face the same 
price level. Therefore, the major determinant of the individual’s participation in such forest 
degrading activities are the individual’s own opportunity cost, which is determined by a few 
factors like land holding, educational attainment, availability of off-farm jobs in the locality, social 
network and availability of credit, as mentioned earlier in section III. 
 
Further, the common factors, which determine the individual’s opportunity cost, are the access to 
credit and availability of off-farm unskilled jobs in the locality. In our study area both are missing. 
The low level of household income in the locality also has not helped the development of rural 
informal sector, which would have created off-farm job opportunities. Therefore, the major 
determinants of individual’s opportunity cost in our study area are the household’s land holdings 
and educational attainment. 
 
Table-2: Land Holding of Households and Indulgence in Forest 
Degradation 
 Household having at least one individual  
Involved in forest degrading activities 
Land Holding No Yes Total 
No Land 10 
(22.7) 
74 
(77.1) 
84 
(60) 
>0 – 1 acre 16 
(36.4) 
22 
(22.9) 
38 
(27.1) 
1 – 2 acres 12 
(27.3) 
0 
(0) 
12 
(8.6) 
2 – 5 acres 3 
(6.8) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(2.1) 
Above 5 acres 3 
(6.8) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(2.1) 
Total 44 
(100) 
96 
(100) 
140 
(100) 
Source: Computed from data collected from HH survey 
Note- Values in the parentheses are column percentage 
Chi-Square value 56.14 significant at one- percent level. 
 
5.2.1 Land Holding and Indulgence in Forest Degradation 
 
Land is an important determinant of opportunity cost for the people in rural areas and hence it 
largely influences individual participation in forest degradation. From our study of 140 
households, the majority of the households involved in FDAOF are either landless or marginal 
farmers8. The relationship between landlessness and indulgence in forest degradation is 
established from the chi-square test showing significant result (see Table-2). In addition to the low 
land holdings, low productivity of agriculture due to lack of irrigation facility keeps the 
agricultural production low. In village B and C a number of households also lost the land that 
earlier they occupied in the periphery of the adjacent forest area and now comes under the buffer 
                                                           
8 There is wide difference among economists and different organisations to classify the farmers into different 
categories. Some time times classification is made on the basis of land size and some times on the basis of 
yield. For a broad analysis, see Patnaik, Utsa  (1999) ‘Ascertaining the Economic Characteristics of Peasant 
Classes-in-Themselves in Rural India: A Methodological and Empirical Exercise’.  
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zone of newly created wildlife sanctuary. Due to lack of legal entitlement over that land they also 
did not receive any compensation.  As a result, the villagers are now unable to do any agricultural 
activities. Crop damage by elephants adds up to these woes. Thus a number of households opt to 
leave their land fallow. Out of total 140 households, 96 households are indulged in FDAOF (see 
Table-2); of these 74 households (77%) are landless, 22 households (23%) own land of one acre or 
less. Households owning two acres or above of land are not at all indulged in FDAOF.  
 
5.2.2 Educational Attainment and Indulgence in Forest Degradation 
 
Another determinant of individual’s opportunity cost is their educational attainment. Low or zero 
educational attainment keeps the opportunity cost low if the individual does not possess any 
special inherited skill. Moreover, low educational attainment limits the individual’s access to 
market information and mobility, which determines the entry into any job market. The theoretical 
analysis discussed in earlier section, suggests that in a forest fringe area illiterate people are more 
likely to be involved in FDAOF. However, in a household higher educational attainment of one 
individual has positive externality on the other members. Therefore, instead of individual 
educational attainment, our analysis uses the average years of schooling for the members of 
household above age 5. From our sample, out of 96 households indulged in FDAOF, in 5 
households all the members are illiterate; 67 households have attained 1 to 5 years of schooling. 
Table-3 demonstrates that with the attainment of higher level of education, the household’s 
indulgence in forest degradation decreases, which is reflected from the diminishing number of 
households indulged in FDAOF with the increase in educational attainment. Out of total 96 
households indulged in FDAOF, 67 households have attained only 1 to 5 years of schooling, and 
only a few households are indulged in FDAOF when they have attained higher education. Out of 
the 26 households, which have attained an average 7 to 10 years of schooling 21 (81%) do not 
engage in forest degradation; and only 5 (20%) households remain in such a relationship.  The 
association between the level of educational attainment and involvement in forest degradation is 
strengthened from the chi-square test showing significant result.   
 
Table-3: Average Years of Schooling of the Household 
Members Above Age 5 and Indulgence in Forest Degradation 
 Household having at least one individual  
Involved in forest degrading activities 
Average Years 
of Schooling 
No Yes Total 
0 0 
(0) 
5 
(100) 
5 
(100) 
1 – 5 7 
(9.5) 
67 
(90.5) 
74 
(100) 
5 – 7 14 
(42.2) 
19 
(57.6) 
33 
(100) 
7—10 21 
(80.8) 
5 
(19.2) 
26 
(100) 
10 – 12 2 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(100) 
Total 44 
(31.4) 
96 
(68.6) 
140 
(100) 
Note- Values in the parentheses are row percentage 
Chi Square value (54.5) significant at 1% level 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
 
Further, Table-4 shows the level of educational attainment by an individual (between age 15 to 65 
years) and his/her main occupation. 54% (86 out of 159) of the illiterate people are engaged in 
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FDAOF. With increasing levels of educational attainment the number of individuals engaging in 
forest degradation gradually diminishes. Particularly, few households who have attended the high 
school level of education prefer to engage in forest degradation. Table-4 also reveals that after 
attaining high school education, many (27) people would rather prefer to remain unemployed than 
indulging in forest degrading activities. We also observe that a large number (43) of individuals 
after attaining high school education are engaged in household work. This is explained by the 
social norm of the village-A where no woman engages in work outside the home. Therefore, we 
can draw the conclusion that education has a considerable influence on the individual in 
determining his/her involvement in forest depleting activities.  
 
Table-4: Educational Attainment of the Individual  
(Between Age 15 To 65) and their Main Occupation 
 Educational attainment        (count) 
Main Occupation of the 
individual Illiterate 
UP 
school 
ME 
School 
High 
School 10+2 University 
Total 
No work 14 7 2 0 0 0 23 
Service in govt. sector 0 4 2 13 4 1 24 
Job in private sector 0 0 1 3 1 1 6 
Business 1 3 2 6 2 1 15 
Farming in own land 2 11 4 17 2 1 37 
Share cropping 1 6 2 2 0 0 11 
Wage labour 7 8 6 11 0 1 33 
Firewood collection for sale 86 39 12 8 0 0 145 
Unemployed 8 6 5 27 4 1 51 
Household works 38 34 15 43 2 0 132 
Animal rearing 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Student 0 0 0 16 8 0 24 
Helping the main worker 1 8 3 9 1 1 23 
Total 159 126 54 155 24 7 525 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Although our bi-variate analysis establishes the relationship between landlessness, low human 
capital and involvement in forest degradation we go one step ahead, by undertaking a multi-
variate analysis, to confirm this relation. A multivariate analysis provides the association of each 
independent variable (with the dependent variable) with greater accuracy after controlling for all 
other variables.  
 
Our conceptual model for this purpose is specified as follows: 
Indulgence in Forest degradation = f (landholding, human capital, awareness, income) 
The dependent variable is defined as a binary variable; 1 for households having at least one 
individual involved in FDAOF and 0 for non-involvement. Similarly, dependent variables namely 
landholding and human capital are categorical variables. The former variable is coded as 1 for 
households in possession of land and 0 for households without land; the latter variable is coded as 
1 for the households with average schoolings of high school for all members above age 15 and 
below 65 and 0 for not attaining this level.  Environmental awareness is categorized into three 
groups such as no awareness (0), merely aware (1) and very well aware (2)9. Income variable is 
incorporated in the model as a continuous variable. Indulgence of the household in forest 
                                                           
9 Respondents categorised as merely aware are those who simply say yes and listen from radio; very well 
aware are those who clearly elaborate upon the various impacts of forest degradation. 
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degradation is expected to have a positive relation with landlessness, lack of human capital, poor 
awareness on consequences of forest degradation and low income. To avoid the multi-colinearity 
we have followed the block entry method of logistic regression analysis in SPSS. In separate blocks 
we include an additional variable to measure its effect. The presence of multi-colinearity makes the 
initially significant variable insignificant10. However, our analysis did not show any such problem.  
 
Results of multivariate logistic regression analysis are given in Table-5. Our results come in 
conformity with the conceptual model. The participation of households in FDAOF is influenced by 
various household characteristics. Households, those are landless, lack human capital, and have 
low aggregate household income, are more likely to go for FDAOF.  Our results demonstrate that 
the landless household members are almost 5 times more likely to be involved in forest 
degradation when compared with land owning households. Similarly, households with an average 
educational level below high school are almost 12 times more likely to engage in forest 
degradation as compared to the households with an average educational attainment above high 
school level. The members of households with merely awareness11 on the impact of forest 
degradation are 42 times more likely to be involved in forest degradation and the households with 
no such awareness are 31 times more likely to be involved in forest depletion than the households 
who are very well aware of the impact of forest degradation.  
 
  Table-5: Logistic Regression showing the odds for household’s involvement 
in forest degradation by selected household characteristics 
Variables Model-1 Model-2 
Land Holding 
Have land® 
No Land 
 
1.00 
6.528* 
 
1.00 
5.485* 
Human capital 
Have attained High School® 
Have not attained High School 
 
1.00 
11.584* 
 
1.00 
10.800* 
INCOM 1.00* 1.00# 
Environmental awareness 
Very Well® 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
42.051* 
31.312* 
-2 log likelihood 106.206 84.294 
Model Chi-Square  68.091 90.002 
N 140 140 
Note: * p = <0.01; # p =<0.10 
® - Reference category 
 
From both bi-variate and multivariate analysis we find that landlessness, lack of human capital 
and low or mere environmental awareness have considerable bearing on the rural households 
participation in forest degrading activities. In our analysis the purpose of considering the 
attainment of high school education as the referent category stems from the fact that merely being 
literate (primary or middle school education) hardly makes any difference to an individual in 
terms of skill-gain and better access to information and mobility. In rural areas households, which 
possess land, get income and employment from this. It keeps the opportunity cost of individual 
members high and restricts them from participating in low-yielding forest degrading activities. On 
                                                           
10 For an elaborate analysis of logit model in SPSS see Field (2005) 
11 We have categorized the environmental awareness into three categories. 1st is No awareness, 2nd is merely 
aware (yes) and thirdly very well.  
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the other hand, education plays a vital role in increasing the access to information from external 
world, resulting in increasing mobility, and the possibilities of skilled employment. It increases 
their opportunity cost and discourages them to be involved in forest degrading activities. Further, 
awareness on the impact of forest degradation dissuades members of households from 
participating in forest degradation. Nonetheless, mere awareness of the negative consequences of 
deforestation does not induce individuals to get away from forest degrading activities. Only a high 
level of awareness induces the individual to refrain from such activities. (In section 5.4 we have 
discussed how mere environmental awareness fails to stop individuals from forest degradation). 
 
Table-6 
Ppeople’s awareness on the impact of forest degradation and 
their involvement in forest degradation 
Awareness on 
the impact of 
forest 
degradation 
Household having at least one individual  
Involved in forest degrading activities 
No Yes Total 
No 
Yes 
Very well 
Total 
1 7 8 
19 87 106 
24 2 26 
44 96 140 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
 
5.4 Environmental Awareness and its Internalisation  
 
For conservation of any natural resource by the community members, environmental awareness is 
very much important.  Hussain and Bhattacharya (2004) have stressed the necessity of 
environmental awareness among the community members before the implementation of JFM 
programme. Nonetheless, our study reveals that mere environmental awareness does not 
necessarily get internalised by the community members to act upon forest conservation. Baland 
and Platteau (1996) also point out that unless the impact of resource degradation affects the life of 
community members severely, they hardly come forward for its’ protection. Our sample 
households demonstrate different degrees of environmental awareness and involvement in forest 
degradation (see Table-6).  
 
Table-7 Awareness on the Impact of Forest Degradation in 
Different Villages 
Village 
Awareness on the impact of forest 
degradation 
No Yes Very well  
Village-A 
3 
(9.1) 
27 
(81.8) 
3 
(9.1) 
33 
(100) 
Village-B 
1 
(3) 
12 
(35.3) 
21 
(61.8) 
34 
(100) 
Village-C 
4 
(5) 
67 
(91.8) 
2 
(2.8) 
73 
(100) 
Total 
8 
(6) 
106 
(76) 
26 
(18) 
140 
100 
Note: Values in the parentheses are row percentage 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
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Out of the total 140 respondents, 8 of them show their ignorance of the negative outcome of forest 
degradation and of them in 7 households there is at least one individual indulged in forest 
degrading activities. 106 respondents show moderate awareness but in 87 households there is at 
least one member involved in forest degradation.  Similarly, out of 26 households who show very 
good awareness of impact of forest degradation, 24 remained uninvolved in any type of forest 
degradation activities. The respondents who show their awareness on the impact of forest 
degradation moderately (here, replying yes) reply that they often listen from radio about this. But 
unfortunately their awareness does not get internalised. In this locality, environmental problems 
have also been not so acute as to force the local people to stop forest degradation. Village-wise 
analysis on environmental awareness (see Table-7) reflects that most of the people in village-B and 
village-C show moderate awareness but in village-A a majority show very good awareness. This 
may be simply due to the higher level of education attained by the people in village-A. The failure 
of villagers in village-B and village-C to internalise their moderate environmental awareness could 
be due to their landlessness. Most households in these two villages do not possess land. Therefore, 
the drop of water table or irregular rain caused by rampant forest degradation does not affect them 
much. So far as the direct impact of forest degradation is concerned, since the villagers’ 
opportunity cost is much lower they don’t hesitate to walk a long distance to collect firewood. All 
the respondents in village-B explain the increasing distance of forest from their village over the 
years and degradation in the quality of forest. A few decades ago the forest had been adjacent to 
their village, from where they used to collect firewood as well as timber, but now they have to 
walk down around 12 kilometres for collecting firewood. 
 
Table-8 Main Occupation of the Individuals in 
Village B & C (In percentage) 
Main Occupation of the 
individual 
Male Female Total 
No work 0.5 2.4 1.4 
Service in govt. sector 7.1 0.6 4.0 
Job in private sector 0.5 - 0.3 
Business 2.2  1.1 
Farming in own land 7.1 0.6 4.0 
Share cropping 4.9 - 2.6 
Wage labour 11.5 3.0 7.4 
Collects and sale forest 
products for income 
34.6 46.7 40.4 
Unemployed 19.8 1.8 11.2 
Household works 0.5 40.1 19.5 
Animal rearing - 0.6 0.3 
Student 6.6 1.2 4.0 
Helping the main worker 4.4 3.0 3.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
 
5.5 Role of Women in Forest Degradation  
 
Out of three villages, in village-A no individual is involved in forest degradation to earn their 
livelihood. However, in village B and C most households are engaged in forest degradation.  Out 
of 349 people in the working age group of these two villages (between 15 and 60) 182 are male and 
167 are female. 46.7% of the women’s main occupation is collection of firewood for sale (See Table-
8). Similarly, 34.6% of men are engaged in same activity. In these two villages it is generally 
preferred that the female member go to forest for collecting firewood whether for sale or domestic 
use. The reason behind this is, as villagers explain, the penalty for a woman if caught by the forest 
guard is lesser than that of men. If the forest guard catches women they simply have to surrender 
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their sickle or axe along with seize of the bundle of firewood. But in case of men, the penalty could 
be in terms of money or sometimes jail.  Further, on availability, men work as wage labour in the 
neighbour villages or do farming in their own land or sharecropping. Another reason for women 
going to forests could be the non-availability of enough other work in the locality.  
 
5.6 Do Tribals Degrade Forest? 
 
There is a debate in India whether tribals are involved in forest degradation or not. In the literature 
it is widely described and also there is a general notion that tribals don’t degrade forest since they 
depend on it for their livelihood. Nevertheless, from the findings of our study it seems that the 
romanticized notion that tribals are the conservators of forest cannot be generalized and should be 
taken with caution while going for policy recommendations. Table-9 shows the caste category and 
involvement in forest degradation. From the sample of 140 households only the tribal households 
are engaged in forest degradation. It is observed that tribals are mostly engaged in forest 
degradation to meet their basic livelihood needs. A broad analysis of their economic conditions 
will help us to find the reason behind their involvement in forest degradation. 
 
Table-9: Caste Category and Forest Dependency 
 Household having at least one individual  
Involved in forest degrading activities 
Caste Category No Yes Total 
General 26 0 26 
OBC 6 0 6 
SC 2 0 2 
ST 10 96 106 
Total 44 96 140 
Note: OBC – Other Backward Caste 
SC – Scheduled Caste; ST – Scheduled Tribe 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
 
From our study of 140 households, 84 households are landless and of them 79 households are 
tribal. Not a single tribal household has land of more than 2 acres (see Table-10). Out of 106 tribal 
households 79 are landless, 25 households have land of 1 acre or less, and only 2 have land 
between one to two acres. As mentioned earlier, the marginal farmers hardly get any yield from 
their land as it is poorly irrigated. Due to high frequency of crop damage by elephants, many 
households leave their small amount of land fallow. During the interview of households, they 
claimed unequivocally that they don’t get any compensation for crop damage, even after 
complaining at the forest office, and when they do, the amount is very low and arrives too late. 
 
Thus agriculture has zero or negligible contribution to these tribal households to provide food and 
employment. At the same time, people in the working age group are either illiterate or merely 
literate without any job skills. They also lack information regarding other employment 
opportunities. Even though sometimes they go out in search of work, labour contractors cheat 
them. Further, the socio-cultural factors also work against their mobility. There is hardly any 
employment opportunity available in their locality. Therefore, the ultimate alternative left for them 
is to clear forest, which is easily accessible, and sell firewood and charcoal in the local market to 
meet their subsistence requirements. 
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Table-10: Caste Category and Agricultural landholding 
 Caste Category  
Size of agricultural 
land holding 
General OBC SC ST Total 
No Land 4 
(4.8) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1.2) 
79 
(94) 
84 
(100) 
>0 – 1 acre 8 
(21.1) 
5 
(13.2) 
0 
(0) 
25 
(65.8) 
38 
(100) 
1 – 2 acres 9 
(75) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(8.3) 
2 
(16.7) 
12 
(100) 
2 – 5 acres 2 
(66.7) 
1 
(33.3) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(100) 
Above 5 acres 3 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(100) 
Total 26 
(18.6) 
6 
(4.3) 
2 
(1.4) 
106 
(75.7) 
140 
(100) 
Source: Computed from the data collected from HH survey 
Note- Values in the parentheses are row percentages 
Chi square value (79.86) significant at 1% level 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
The present study examines the role of rural communities involved in JFM in degrading the de facto 
open access forests. In India only 28 percent of the total forest areas have been brought under JFM 
scheme and the rest 72 percent remains virtually open access to all. A large proportion of 
households in the forest areas are also living under abject poverty. In this context the study brings 
forth important findings for deriving crucial policy implications. The study shows that poverty 
among rural poor households and low opportunity cost forces them to degrade open access 
forests. Although households successfully participate in JFM, they are engaged in degrading open 
access forests to eke out their livelihood. Therefore, implementation of JFM without addressing the 
basic problem of livelihood would not be successful to halt forest degradation by local community. 
In this context, an important policy implication is that the piecemeal implementation of JFM would 
not necessarily result in the conservation of forest at macro level. Therefore, in order to halt forest 
degradation by these communities, different departments and agencies should work hand in hand. 
First step in this direction should be to generate employment opportunities in rural areas. The next 
priority should be skill formation and infrastructure development in rural areas. Education 
increases the employability and mobility of labour. It will enable them to work in other places or 
be self-employed. Role of government is very much important in this direction to break the vicious 
circle. Thirdly, provision should be made for channelling more credit to rural educated youths for 
making them self-employed. Fourthly, allocation of land to the landless would go a long way to 
restrain the local people from forest degradation. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional 
Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 brought out by the Government of India is 
a landmark step in this direction.  However, mere allocation of land would not serve any purpose 
unless the land is of marked quality for cultivation and provision made for irrigation. After 
addressing these basic problems of livelihood, the implementation of JFM would ensure better 
participation of local community in forest conservation. Moreover, in order to halt the illegal 
timber smuggling by outsiders, legal provisions should be made more stringent. Social fencing by 
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the local community would minimize the monitoring cost. Hence, devolution of greater power to 
the local communities would help a great deal to minimize timber smuggling.  
 
Our study also throws new insights to carry out further research on community participation in 
forest conservation. In our study area forests did not yield any immediate return due to lack of 
non-timber forest products. However, there are forest areas where a number of non-timber forests 
products –such as kendu leaves for making bidi, saal and other leaves for making plates, and a 
variety of fruits and leaves having herbal utilities –are available. In many forest areas, eco-tourism 
is also emerging as a major source of income. In these forest areas, if provision made, local 
communities will get immediate return to derive their livelihood and will have better incentives to 
conserve this forest. Therefore, further studies should be carried to examine the different nature of 
forests and community participation in forest conservation.  
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